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Abstract— In this paper we describe a novel pricing strategy
for carrying out lookups and obtaining data in peer-to-peer (P2P)
networks with selfish nodes. Both the resource provider and
intermediate nodes that assist in routing of lookup messages are
appropriately compensated so as to cover their cost of providing
service. This is in contrast to the traditional lookup schemes,
which assume that data is freely available, and intermediate
nodes selflessly cooperate and truthfully follow a given protocol
in carrying out resource lookups. The proposed scheme provides
efficient and natural means to prevent free-riding problem in P2P
networks, and does not require prior trust relationships among
nodes. Moreover, unlike other schemes it does not rely on any
centralized entity or require specialized trusted hardware at each
node.
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost all the current research in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems
is based on a cooperative network model. It is generally assumed
that although there can be rogue nodes in a system most of
the nodes are trustworthy and follow some specific protocol,
as suggested by the network designer. We believe that such
assumptions do not always hold good in large-scale open
systems and have to be done away with in order to make P2P
systems reliable, robust, and to realize their true commercial
potential. Moreover, it has been pointed out that free-riding,
whereby only few altruistic nodes share their resources, is one
of the most significant problems being faced by today’s P2P
networks [1]. Some solutions exist to tackle this problem, but
they suffer from one of the following drawbacks - they are either
too heavy-weight and expensive (for example, require trusted
hardware), or depend on some trusted groups of nodes (or a
trusted centralized entity) to police the network and keep the
free-riders in check. Trust relationships are, however, difficult
to establish in Internet-based P2P settings.
In this paper we describe a novel pricing strategy for carrying
out lookups and obtaining data in P2P networks with selfish
nodes. Both the resource provider and intermediate nodes that
assist in routing of lookup messages are appropriately com-
pensated so as to cover their cost of providing service. This
is in contrast to traditional lookup schemes, which assume
that data is freely available, and intermediate nodes cooperate
and truthfully follow a given protocol in carrying out resource
lookups irrespective of whether they themselves are currently
overloaded or not, for example. The proposed scheme provides
The research reported in this paper is funded in part by Jerry R. Junkins
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efficient and natural means to prevent free-riding problem in
P2P networks and does not require prior trust relationships
among nodes. Moreover, unlike other schemes it does not rely
on any centralized entity or require specialized trusted hardware
at nodes. Therefore, the proposed scheme incurs low overhead
and is highly robust.
The protocol proposed here is essentially an incentive-driven
protocol, which ensures that rewards received by intermediate
nodes and resource providers for routing and serving requests,
respectively, are maximized by following the protocol steps.
Please see [2] for a discussion on developing protocols con-
sidering the profit-maximizing strategies of individual nodes.
A distinguishing feature of the proposed protocol is that it ad-
dresses the problem of incentivizing peers for sharing resources
and routing messages for others in a unified manner.
II. RELATED WORK
The need for developing protocols for selfish agents (nodes)
in P2P systems has often been stressed before (see [2], [3]). The
research in [4], [5] provides solution to avoid the free-riding
problem in P2P networks. The basic approach in all of these is
to make sure that nodes indeed share their resources before they
themselves can obtain services from a network. Also, most of
these solutions rely on self-less participation of groups of trusted
nodes to monitor/police the activities of individual nodes and
ensure that everyone contributes to the system.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing solutions
that deals with the problem of free-riding in P2P networks
also address the more basic question of why nodes would
route messages for others. Since these nodes belong to end
users without any centralized controlling authority, they may
in order to conserve their bandwidth and other resources, such
as buffer space, memory etc., may drop messages received for
forwarding. The problem of selfishness in routing has been
encountered and addressed in the context of mobile ad-hoc
networks (see [6], [7]). Some of these proposals can also find
application in P2P networks.
III. NETWORK MODEL
We assume a P2P network model, wherein nodes act selfishly.
By selfish we mean that nodes try to maximize their profits given
any possible opportunity. The profit from a transaction (or an
activity) is equal to the difference between the reward that a
node earns and the cost that it incurs by participating in the
transaction. An example of a transaction is a lookup process,
i.e. the process of searching for and downloading a desired data
object. Nodes process and forward lookup messages if there is
a potential for earning reward in future. The reward can be
anything that is deemed to have value, the possession of which
adds to a node’s utility.
We assume that for each resource there is a single server
in the network.1 Resource indices are replicated at k different
nodes, which are called the terminal nodes for that resource.
They are so called because lookup messages are first routed
to these nodes from where they are sent directly to the server
node (in one logical hop). Terminal nodes maintain a mapping
(called index) from a resource name or ID to the IP address
of the server providing that resource. For a resource, say R,
its terminal nodes are denoted by  
	 . The
routing of a message from a client to a terminal node may
go through other intermediate nodes. This list of intermediate
nodes along with the terminal node (and the client) is referred
to as a request chain. For simplicity request chains comprising
of different terminal nodes for the same resource are assumed
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Fig. 1. Formation of request chains due to the propagation of lookup requests.
For a lookup process initiated by a client, a network can be
modelled as comprising of three types of entities - the client
itself, the intermediate nodes (including the terminal nodes),
and the server providing resource. Nodes incur a cost, due
to bandwidth, memory etc., during a lookup process and is
represented by  for a node, x. The cost incurred by a
server (and also intermediate nodes) increases in proportion to
the amount of its traffic and any request offering less than its
marginal cost is not fulfilled. Since, clients incur a cost for
their lookups, we assume that it is in the clients’ best interest
to successfully obtain the resource in as few lookup transactions
or attempts as possible.
Unless otherwise specified, all message communication is
assumed to provide message non-repudiation. Our protocol
relies on message non-repudiation to ensure that nodes do not
go back on their commitment as suggested by the content of the
messages sent by them. We assume that there is a mechanism
in place to punish nodes if it can be proven that they did not
fulfill their commitments.2
The proposed protocol can be considered as the distributed
implementation of a mechanism described in [2]. This is be-
cause it is in each intermediate node’s best interest to report its
1The terms resource and data are used interchangeably throughout the paper.
2In an enterprise computing environment there might be a central authority
one can report to in order to identify and punish the cheating node. For large-
scale open systems one can use reputation mechanisms to ensure that cheating
nodes are accurately identified and isolated from receiving services.
true marginal cost for forwarding a lookup request. Moreover,
the collection of input values (i.e. marginal costs) and handing
out of payments to nodes is done in a distributed manner rather
than by some centralized entity.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF INCENTIVE-DRIVEN PROTOCOL
The proposed mechanism correspond to activities in real-
world economic markets, where buyers pay money to sellers and
intermediaries that facilitate the transactions. However, unlike in
real-world, there are no well established protocols (government
rules and policies), and institutions and infrastructure (such as
stock exchanges) in a typical P2P setting that can govern the
parameters (such as the price charged, the place of occurrence
etc.) of the transactions. Due to such constraints several non-
trivial issues need to be addressed - setting resource prices,
determining payoffs to intermediate, preventing cheating etc. We
now explain how all such issues are addresses by the proposed
protocol. To simplify our discussion, we take an example of a
lookup process and see how it is carried out under the given
protocol.
A. Parallel Resource Lookup
The client (C) before initiating the lookup process estimates
its utility (  ) of the resource (R) to calculate the maximum
price that it can offer for the resource. C then sends a separate
lookup message towards each of the terminal nodes. Together
these parallel lookup messages constitute a single lookup pro-
cess initiated by C for R.
Each lookup message  !#""$&%' contains the following
information, as included by the client - address of one of the
k terminal nodes (   ), the resource ID ( ( ), the maximum
price offered ( )  ), the marginal cost ( +*,"-*,.&! ), the request
IDs ( (/101324'56#78.&*,9 and (/101:2;'%4<=!>6@? ).
(A/10132 '8%4<=!>6B? identifies the lookup process such that S (and
intermediate nodes) on receiving multiple lookup messages
knows that the messages pertain to the same lookup process.
Thus, the same value of (/C0132'%4<,!#6@? is included in all the lookup
messages. On the other hand, a unique value of (/10132D'5E6@78.F*,9 is
included in each of the lookup messages. In Section IV-E, we
illustrate the significance of (/101:2'56#78.F*,9 . G*,"-*,.F! contains C’s
marginal cost   . Each intermediate node on receiving the
lookup message updates +*,"H*,.F! by adding its own marginal
cost to the received value.
Intermediate nodes for all the lookup messages route the
received lookup message to the next hop neighbor (called the
successor node) and this process continues till the message
reaches the desired terminal node. Since the terminal nodes
store the index containing the IP address of S, they contact
S in order to obtain the resource. S receive k such requests and
from the (/101:2;'%4<=!>6B? values knows that all the requests pertain
to the same lookup process. S then holds a second price sealed-
bid auction (also called Vickrey auction [8], [2]) with all the
terminal nodes as the bidders. S provides the resource to the
terminal node that offers the highest price. The request chain
containing the highest bidder, i.e. the winning terminal node, is
called the winning request chain WRC.
B. Bidding for the Resource By the Terminal Nodes
In Vickrey auction, the highest bidder wins the auction, but
the price that it has to pay is equal to the second highest
bid. Vickrey auction has several desirable properties, such as
existence of truth revelation as a dominant strategy, efficiency,
low cost etc. Vickrey auction in its most basic form is designed
to be used by altruistic auctioneers, which are concerned with
overall system efficiency or social good as opposed to self-
gains. Self-interested auctioneer is one of the main reasons why
Vickrey auction did not find widespread popularity in human
societies (see [9]).
Since, S (the auctioneer) behaves selfishly and tries to maxi-
mize its profit, the auction process needs to ensure the following.  Selecting the highest bidder is the best strategy for S.  The price paid by the highest bidder is indeed equal to the
second highest bid, i.e. S should reveal true second highest
bid to the highest bidder.  Collusion among S and the bidders should not be possible.
In view of the above requirements, we provide a two-phase
secure Vickrey auction protocol, which is described in Section
IV-C. In subsequent discussion, we denote the highest and
second highest bids by  and  , respectively. The price
offered by a terminal node to S is equal to )   G*,"-*,.&! . The
amount of profit made by the WRC is equal to
    .
This profit is shared fairly among the nodes of the WRC (and
the client) in proportion to their marginal costs, i.e. nodes with
higher marginal costs get a higher proportion of the total profit,
and vice versa.
C. Secure Vickrey Auction to Determine the Resource Price
S employs a two-phase Vickrey auction to select the high-
est bidder and determine the price at which the resource is
provided. In the first phase, the bidders send encrypted copies
( 	 
 2 / 6&6  ) of their bids in message  < 6 to S. Here
	 
 2 / 6&6  is the encryption of bid value 6 of terminal
node   using a randomly chosen secret key 
 2 /6 . Each
message  D< 6 also includes (/10132;'%1<=!>6B? value received by a
terminal node, so that S can determine that the bids pertain to
the same lookup process. The received encrypted bids are sent
by S back to all the bidders in message  < 65F9='8!  . Since
after receiving  D< 65F9='8!  , the bidders have encrypted copies
of all the bids (total  such bids), S is unable to (undetectedly)
alter existing or add fake bids.
In the next and last phase of the auction, each bidder after
receiving the message  < 6 59='8!  , sends its secret key in
message  $89! to S. The received key values are now sent
by S back to all the bidders in message  $89!5F9='8!  . At the
end of this phase, S and all the bidders are able to open the
encrypted bids and find out about the highest and second highest
bids."
then sends message  ?3935E* to the winning terminal node
(  $#&%' ) certifying that it has won the auction. The received
certificate is forwarded along the reverse path, i.e. opposite to
that followed by the lookup request, till it reaches C. C then
finds out that the resource has been looked up and is available
at a price within its initial offer of )  .  ?3935E* contains
the following information - the highest bid   , the second
highest bid   , the total marginal cost  *,"-*,.&! (received
by S in 8 < 6 ), and the IP addresses of all the terminal
nodes that participated in the auction (we later explain how
this information is utilized by C in order to verify the auction
results).
The information in messages  ?3935H* and  !#""$&%' allow
the intermediate nodes, including    #(%' , to calculate their
reward for being part of the WRC. The possession of messages
 D?3935E* and 8 !#"E"$&%' serves as a contract between a node
and its predecessor regarding the reward that it is entitled to
receive (from the predecessor). The knowledge of the auction
results also enables C to determine the price that it finally has
to pay for ( . The calculation of the exact payoff values are
discussed below.
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Fig. 2. A lookup example illustrating how payoffs are distributed among the
WRC nodes based on their marginal costs.
8 D?39-5H* includes the total marginal cost value +*,"H*,.F! of all
the nodes in the WRC. This information along with the highest
and second highest bids determine each WRC node’s payoff.
For example, node x’s payoff )   is calculated as follows.
)   *)  ,+   G*,"H*,.F!.-
      / (1)
The amount received by S is equal to   ( 0 (1 ). The
profit share of C, i.e. the portion of its initial offer that it saves
or gets to keep, is similarly calculated as given below.
) 
243 65  )
  G*,"-*,.F! -
 7  8 (2)
Let us consider a simple example given in Figure 2 to better
understand the above equations. Three request chains (shown as
(  E(  and (&9 ) are formed as part of the lookup process
initiated by node A. Numbers within the circles represent the
nodes’ marginal costs. T1, T2, T3 are the respective terminal
nodes that store the resource index, i.e. they store the IP address
of node B that owns the desired resource. B on receiving the
lookup requests conducts a Vickrey auction, as a result of which
T1 is selected as the winner, but the price it pays is 60. The
results of the auction are sent back to A, and also seen by
all the intermediate nodes along (: . The resulting payoffs to
the intermediate nodes and B are indicated in the figure. For
example, payoff to node 1 is 13.33 (=10 + (10/30)*(70-60)).
A’s profit share is 3.33 (= (10/30)*(70-60)). Thus, A effectively
has to pay 86.67(=100-10-3.33) for a resource whose utility to
it (after deducting the marginal cost) is in fact 90. Therefore,
the proposed scheme based on Vickrey auction ensures that
  	
 	        !	"$#
&% ('   !"$# ) +* -,  % (. /102354 #&67 85:9<;=?>   !"$# 
@%? ('     % A.5B ),?DC E /1023&4 #@67 85<9:;=>   !"$#
@%? (' 5	,<C 2354 #&67 	85   	!"$#
&%? A'  ,<C B ),FDC E 2354 #&67 85   !"$# 
@%? ('  ' ,<)  HG   JI   !"$#
@%? ('     IP addresses KML  
TABLE I
VARIOUS MESSAGES COMPRISING THE INCENTIVE-DRIVEN PROTOCOL
everyone, including the client, server, and intermediate nodes
constituting the WRC benefit, i.e. earn more than their marginal
costs, by participating in the lookup process. This potential of
earning higher profits motivate nodes to share their resources
and forward messages for others.
C after receiving  ?3935E* determines and takes away its
profit share and gives the remainder of its initial offer to the
successor node along the WRC. The successor node determines
its own payoff using Equation 1 and after keeping that amount
transfers the remaining to its successor and so on. This process
is repeated till the server receives its due payoff. In the above
example, A after keeping its profit share (and the amount equal
to its marginal cost) gives 86.67 to 1, which after keeping
its payoff gives 73.34 to T1. Now T1 after keeping its payoff
gives the remaining (i.e., 60 ( N 73.34-13.33)) to B. The amount
received by B thus equals 8 (=60).
A node cannot default on its payment to its successor, since
as mentioned earlier, the content of messages (  !#""E$&%' and
8 ?39-5H* ) form a non-refutable contract between a node and its
predecessor regarding the amount of money that the node is to
receive from its predecessor.
Figure 3 summarizes the steps involved in the incentive-
driven protocol. The various messages used, along with the
information they contain, are also summarized in Table I for
an easy reference.
E. Threat Models
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of the proposed
incentive-driven protocol in the face of nodes’ selfishness. In
particular, we identify and analyze our protocol for potential
threat models and show that truthfully following the protocol
steps is the best strategy for the selfish nodes.
1) Threat Model A (Cheating by the auctioneer).: Since
the auction by S takes place in a completely distributed en-
vironment, the bidders are unaware of each others’ bids and
also cannot monitor S’s activities. In such a scenario, using
the traditional single-step Vickrey auction, where the bidders
directly send their bids in clear to the auctioneer, would enable
S to easily manipulate the auction results. To understand this, let
us again consider the example given in Figure 2. If traditional
Vickrey auction is used, then B on receiving the three bids of 70,
60, and 50 knows that T1, which is the highest bidder, is willing
to pay any amount less than or equal to 70 for R. Therefore, B
can send a message to T1 that it is the highest bidder, but the
amount it has to pay (i.e. the second highest bid) is 69. This
way B wrongly makes an additional profit of 9.
In order to counter the problem of addition of fake bids (for
example, the bid value 69 as explained above) and manipulation
Step 1: Client initiates the lookup process by sending a
lookup message OQPR  	
 towards S  :TVUWYX[Z@\]]]\^`_
- Intermediate nodes update the value of Oba  before
forwarding the lookup message
- Lookup messages reach the terminal nodes
/* Vickrey auction - Phase I */
Step 2: Terminal nodes on receiving ObPR  	
 sendOQPR % (. to the server
Step 3: Server waits for k OQPR % A. messages (i.e. bids) or
till some maximum time c
- Bids are identified as belonging to the same lookup
process by using the value d1ef U?g 
&%? A'
Step 4: Server sends message ObPR % (.&B ),?DC to the terminal
nodes
- After the above step the bidders have encrypted copies
of all the bids
/* Vickrey auction - Phase II */
Step 5: Terminal nodes send their secret key to the server
in message ObPR ,:C
Step 6: Server replies with a message OQPR ,<C B ),FDC
distributing the secret keys among the bidders
/* Vickrey auction ends */
Step 7: Server sends message ObPR ' ,<) to S  #(%' . This
message is sent to the client using the reverse lookup path
Step 8: Client verifies the auction results by contacting the
bidding terminal nodes
Step 9: Reward is given to the nodes of the WRC (including
the server and client)
Fig. 3. Incentive-driven protocol steps
of submitted bids by an auctioneer, we use a two-phase Vickrey
auction as described in Section IV-C. Now the auctioneer, before
it can read the bids, has to give encrypted copies of all the
received bids back to the bidders. Therefore, in the above
example, B is unable to send fake bid 69 after finding that T1’s
bid is 70.
One might argue that there is a possibility for the auctioneer
to send different encrypted bids to different bidders if it stands to
gain by doing so. However, this strategy would not be effective
unless the auctioneer has prior information about the bids it is
going to receive, as shown next. Using the same example, let
T1’s bid be 69, instead of 70 as anticipated by B. Therefore,
during the first phase of the secure Vickrey auction protocol, B
encrypts values 50, 60 and 70 and sends it to all the bidders.
Here 50 and 60 represent the actual bids and 70 is the fake bid.
In the second phase, T1 (and also T2 and T3) after receiving the
decryption keys finds that the highest bid is 70 and that it has
lost the auction. Thus, none of the bidders get selected as the
winner and B by faking the bids gets a payoff of 0 as opposed
to 60 that it could have received by not cheating.
It is possible that even the knowledge of the distribution of
the bid values and the number of bids might be exploited by the
auctioneer. The auctioneer can send different combinations of
encrypted bids to different bidders in order to fake the auction
results and thus maximize its expected profit. Such situations
are easily handled by the solution proposed for the next threat
model. Basically, the strategy is to ensure that the auctioneer
is unable to send different bids to different bidders. This is
achieved without requiring any costly and difficult to implement
communication among the bidders themselves.
2) Threat Model B (Collusion between S and    #(%' ).: The
proposed protocol relies on the fact that correct auction results
are sent back to C, so that the reward is fairly distributed among
all the nodes comprising the WRC. However, it is possible for
S and    #(%' to collude and make higher profits by including
a fake second highest bid value in  ?39-5H* . For example, in
Figure 2, by including the value of   as 69 (instead of 60) in
8 D?39-5H* , T1 receives the payoff of 79.34 from node 1, instead
of 73.34 that it receives by not colluding. This higher payoff
can be shared between S and  $#&%' and so they both benefit
with this collusion.
As mentioned earlier, the message  ?3935H* sent back to C
includes the information (i.e. the IP addresses) of all the terminal
nodes that participated in the auction. C on receiving this
information can verify the truthfulness of the received auction
results by contacting any (or all) of the listed terminal nodes.
These terminal nodes are given incentive to reveal the truth,
i.e. disclose the true values of the highest and second highest
bid in the auction. The terminal node that identifies that there
is a discrepancy (if any) between the auction results received
by C and the actual values, is referred to as the whistle blower
  $#   	 DD&  . C can give  $#  part of the money
that it saves by detecting the collusion.3
A lookup transaction can be considered as a one-shot game
in which each participant tries to maximize its profit in a single
play of the game. One-shot model is reasonable to assume
because the network under consideration is large, distributed,
and dynamic. Moreover, it is difficult for nodes to monitor and
keep track of others that do not fulfill their collusion agreement.
Thus, the terminal nodes have incentive to become a whistle-
blower, as they get additional reward from the client (possibly
in addition to what they receive from the server for not revealing
the truth).
Moreover, C upon contacting the terminal nodes ensures that
they have the same auction results, i.e. they received the same
encrypted bids from the auctioneer during phase one of the
auction. Thus, any cheating by the auctioneer, such as sending
different encrypted bids to different bidders, as mentioned in
threat model A, can be easily detected by C. This is achieved
without incurring excessive message communication overhead
required in any bidder discovery and verification protocol, in
which bidders identify each other and cross-check each others’
bid values.
In effect, C acts as a centralized controller for its lookup
process and ensures that no cheating by the auctioneer and/or
collusion between the auctioneer and winning terminal node
3Note that the terminal nodes have verifiable copies of the encrypted bids
and corresponding keys that they receive from the auctioneer. This verification
is possible due to message non-repudiation.
takes place.4
3) Threat Model C (Sending incorrect terminal nodes infor-
mation).: The prevention of collusion in threat model B relies
on the fact that the information about the terminal nodes sent
by S back to C in  ?3935E* is correct. However, it is possible
for S to include fake information about nodes, which it control
or with whom it has prior collusive agreement, such that they
are guaranteed not to be the whistle blowers. C will then have
no way of cross-checking the bid values and would end up
paying more than what it should. To prevent such a possibility, C
includes a unique request ID (/101:2'56#78.&*,9 in each of the lookup
request messages it sends. Upon contacting a terminal node, C
requests the (/101:2'856@78.F*,9 value that the node has to make sure
that the value is indeed one of the values it initially included in
a lookup message. This provides a method for terminal nodes’
authentication, as C can be sure that it is interacting with a valid
terminal node.
4) Threat Model D (Over-reporting of marginal costs and
under-reporting of utility values).: We have shown how Vickrey
auction can be used to establish utility-driven pricing in a
completely untrusted and distributed P2P environments. Vickrey
auction results in fair pricing, in the sense that it reward clients
for being truthful in stating their true utilities for the resources,
and also the intermediate nodes for revealing their true marginal
costs for forwarding the lookup requests.
An increase in the G*,"H*,.F! value for a request chain lowers
its final bid, thereby reducing its chances of winning the auction.
If intermediate nodes run specialized learning algorithm and
gather privilege information about the network state, such as
other intermediate nodes’ marginal costs that comprise the
different request chains, then they may benefit (i.e. make higher
profits) by quoting a higher marginal cost and still be part
of a WRC. Such information, however, is not easy to obtain
in a highly dynamic environments, and also the information
about current network state may not remain valid even in near
future periods. In addition, implementing such algorithms can be
expensive. Therefore, to minimize *,"-*,.&! it is in each node’s
best interest to report its true marginal cost.
One may argue that an intermediate node can increase its
profit by only slightly increasing its true marginal cost, while not
jeopardizing its chances of still being part of a WRC. However,
we show that in the absence of any privilege information,
revealing true marginal cost is the optimal strategy for a node.
This result is summarized in the form of the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Given that a client’s utility for a resource being
looked up is bounded (for example, in Chord [10] if it is less
than four times the total marginal cost of nodes comprising the
WRC), the best strategy for an intermediate node is to report its
true marginal cost while forwarding a lookup request.
Proof: Let the price offered by bidders (terminal nodes)
to an auctioneer (server) are in the interval from   )
	 . There
are  (  0 0  ) bidders and we assume that all the  bids are
uniformly distributed in the interval   )
	 . The average distance
4In fact, the proposed solution is effective even if all the nodes (except the
client) of the WRC collude to get a higher payoff for themselves. This is because
the client’s profit share is dependent only on its own marginal cost as well as
the auction results, which it can verify from the terminal nodes.
between a bid and the next higher bid (assuming that there is
one) is  $  .
Further consider a node, i, which is part of some request
chain and has a true marginal cost of  6 . For simplicity, we
assume that all the nodes belonging to i’s request chain have the
same marginal cost. We would show that if all the other nodes
(except i) that are part of the lookup process report their true
marginal costs, then the best strategy for node i is to report its
true marginal cost only.5 To understand this, let node i falsely
increase its marginal cost by  (  6 ) and report it as
 6+  instead of  6 . Some other variables that we use are
defined below.
  = total marginal cost of the nodes belonging to the same
request chain as node i.   includes  6 .
 = price offered by the terminal node of node i’s request
chain to the server.  	   E)
	 .
For simplicity, we say that   +  ) ) . This is based on the
assumption that ) represents the client’s utility for the resource
being looked for and that the client uses its true utility value
while initiating the lookup process.
Since node i gets a payoff only if the terminal node of
its request chain wins the auction, its payoff when it acts
truthfully and falsely, represented as 	 and 	
	 , respectively,
are calculated as follows:
	




 +  -
+6
  + +6 	 (3)




 +     -
 6 + 
  +  +  6 +  	 (4)
The first term on the right hand side of both the Equations 3
and 4 describe the probability that node i is part of the WRC and
the second term gives the payoff that it subsequently receives.
We now proceed to show that under the condition when )
-   , 	
	 is less than 	 . For tractability, we further assume aChord based P2P network, where the number of neighbors of a
node is approximately twice the average hop length of a lookup
path. In other words,   ) $  -  6 .	
 is greater than 		 if 	
	  	
  , i.e. if
 $ 
) $  -
     $  - 
 )
 +     -
 6 + 
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+6
  + +6 	 
or
 $ 
) $  -
        -

  - 
 )
 +     -
+6 + 





 +  -
 6
  +  6 	 
In the above, we use binomial expansion to solve
  +  $   )        -
 . Higher order terms are ignored, since
they anyway further reduce 		 . Solving the above inequality
we get,
5From Equation 1 we know that a node can get a higher payoff by falsely
reporting a higher marginal cost value.

   +







Thus, if      , we have 	 	 7	  . This proves that if the
client’s utility (or ) ) is less than    , truthfully reporting the
marginal cost maximizes one’s (here node i’s) payoff.
Moreover, a client’s goal to obtain a resource in a single
lookup transaction is best served if it sets maximum possible
price for the desired resource and that price is the client’s
utility for the resource. The server’s marginal cost of serving
the request (and of the intermediate nodes) is unknown to the
client and can be high depending on the number of requests
it is currently serving. Together these factors ensure that using
the actual utility value for setting the offered price is the best
strategy for a client.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented an incentive-driven proto-
col for searching and trading resources in uncooperative P2P
networks. The protocol provides incentive to nodes to share
their resources and route messages for others. We developed
resource pricing in a dynamic and selfish environment and how
to avoid collusion among nodes. Our proposed protocol takes
selfish behavior of network nodes into account and ensures that
their rewards are maximized if they adhere to the protocol steps.
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